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“I Have To Confess I Cannot Read
History So,” 
On the Origins and Development of Peirce’s Philosophy of History 
Alessandro Topa
AUTHOR'S NOTE
I am indebted to the two anonymous referees, the editors and Emily Smith for
suggestions that improved this paper.
“The science of knowledge is to be a pragmatic
history of the human mind.” 
Fichte, 1794
“Nature’s highest goal, to become wholly an object
to herself, is achieved only through the last and
highest order of reflection, which is none other
than man; or, more generally, it is what we call
reason, whereby nature first completely returns
into herself, and by which it becomes apparent
that nature is identical from the first with what we
recognize in ourselves as the intelligent and the
conscious.” 
Schelling, 1800
“Our physical science, whatever extravagant
historicists may say, seems to have sprung up
uncaused except by man’s intelligence and
nature’s intelligibility, which never could before
be operative because it was not studied minutely.
But modern philosophy had no such divine birth.
On the contrary, it pays the usual tax upon
inheritances from revolutions. It was the product
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of a double and triple revolution – the





1 The task of speaking about the origins and development of Peirce’s philosophy of history is
confronted with difficulties, the articulation of which will prefigure our understanding of
the question and determine the direction in which an answer shall be sought. Let us,
therefore, first establish some common ground: Readers of Peirce will certainly agree that
his  écriture is  pervaded  by  an  encyclopaedic 1 and  intensely  curious  historical
consciousness  that  neither  shies  away from the  consideration of  minute  details  (see
below) nor from the responsibility  to understand the causes  of  large scale  historical
processes  (see  third  epigraph  above)  and  is  nourished  by  the  modern  ideal  of  our
deliverance from idola: “one of the main purposes of studying history ought to be to free
us from the tyranny of our preconceived notions,” writes Peirce in 1901. Thus when he
reflects on an explanation of certain habits of mind that govern Aristotle’s inquiries by
conceiving  of  him as the  “scion of  a  family  whose  every  member,  from the  further
prehistoric times had been trained in medicine” and did, therefore, not share “the Hellenic
repugnance to dissection” (CP 2.12), we see him jotting a memo: 
Before this goes to press, I have to go over three books: Barthélemy St. Hilaire’s Ed.
of  Arist.  Historia  Animal  2.  Littré’s  Hippocrates  3.  The  best  German  history  of
medicine. (MS 425: 14, lower left margin)
2 To return to the sources and,  at  the same time,  identify and read the best  available
account of  the historical  development in any field of  knowledge,  touches upon what
would become a routine in the intellectual metabolism of Peirce the historian of science,
logic and philosophy.
3 Here, however, a first problem arises: the objectivistic outlook animating the routines of
Peirce the historian reflects stances taken by Peirce the philosopher of history. There
thus seems to be, as Esposito (1983) points out, a strong “narrativist” strand in Peirce’s
philosophical  conception of  history:  “the  view of  the  past  as  an  objective  actuality”
(Esposito 1983:  160)  resulting from an application of  the pragmatic understanding of
inquiry and reality to the realm of the past.  If  the real is the object of that ultimate
opinion we would ultimately agree upon, then our knowledge of the past must lead to
testable consequences that would eventually confirm a theory of what the past, as an
objective  sequence  of  events,  was  truly  like  (cf.  CP 2.642,  5.461).  In  contrast to  this,
however,  Esposito  finds  a  less prominent  “transcendentalist”  (Esposito  1983:  156)
conception,  in  which  “the  term  ‘history’  seems  to  refer  to  a  particular  theoretical
construction of human temporal activity” (Esposito 1983: 164). Indeed Peirce can speak of
a “logic of history”2 in the sense of a logic of its processuality, which is capable of being
guided by human intentionality; but Esposito is, nonetheless, mistaken in diagnosing a
“dearth of arguments from Peirce that clearly assume the transcendentalist perspective”
(Esposito 1983: 164) because he fails to realize how prominent texts such as “Fixation of
Belief” assume such a perspective, which, however, is not in contrast to the objectivistic
stance but rather complementary to it, as the approach to the historical in these texts is
geared towards disclosing and enabling the growth of a normative component in our
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understanding of history. Thus for Peirce, objectivism notwithstanding, if history were to
be tackled in a dégagé third-person perspective,  it would mean to refuse to see what
history really is (cf. EP 1: 364, 369; CP 2.111-8). As a particular object of philosophy, history
thus  is  a  subject  that  transcends  Esposito’s  dichotomies  because  our  first-person
conception of  it  –  our ‘agent’s  knowledge’3 –  determines the mode in which we will
actualize (or disrupt) historical continua in our actions.4 
4 This leads to the next problem: Peirce was not only interested in development as an
historian, but also as a metaphysician. Where literally everything developmental seems to
become historical, however, traditional distinctions could seem to have been abandoned
without offering any substitute. As Hampe (2006) has aptly characterized this aspect of
Peirce’s  philosophy of  history,  his  evolutionary  metaphysics  –  in  which processes  of
habit-taking  propel  the  emergence  of  regularities  in  the  development  of  nature  and
civilization  –  ultimately  interlaces  the  historicization  of  nature with  a  naturalization  of
history5 so that the difference between historia naturalis and historia rerum gestarum seems
to become obsolete, unless the subtlety of Peirce’s conception of the normativity and self-
referentiality  of  our  own  conception  of  history  is  properly  acknowledged.  It  is  no
coincidence that his cosmogonic philosophy of the early 1890s culminates in the vision of a
creative “agapastic” form of the historical development of human thought, but instead
indicates an essential element of Peirce’s “realistic idealism” (MS 400) with its aim to
“gain room to insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is needed,
into the position which, as the sole self-intelligible thing, it is entitled to occupy.”6 It is, thus,
only in the acknowledgment of the agapic processual-semeiotic causes and conditions that
have  led  to  the  emergence  of  such  a  “sole  self-intelligible  thing”  that  we  commit
ourselves to a normative conception of history as the developmental form of an “endless
perfectibility” (W 1: 114). 
5 The term “philosophy of history,” however, is nowhere used in the Monist series. Thus, a
third problem emerges:  If  we look into Peirce’s mature classifications of the heuretic
sciences (a hierarchy of interdependent research activities that, being “the pursuit of
living men,” exist in an “incessant state of metabolism and growth,” EP2: 129), we see that
Peirce  reserves  a  place  for  a  family  of  historiographic  sciences  he  refers  to  as
“[descriptive] Psychognosy” (CP 1.272) or “Descriptive Psychics, or history” (CP 1.189), but
nowhere  in  this  classification  can  we  detect  anything  that  reflects  the  necessity  to
philosophically come to terms with history as a dimension and vector of that experience all
men have in common and in which our relatedness to the world, ourselves and others is
rooted (cf.  EP 2:  372-3),  whether in its  meaning as res  gestae, or ‘that which factually
happened,’ or in its meaning as a historia rerum gestarum, i.e. as a ‘knowledge of what has
happened.’ What we can derive from Peirce’s architectonic enframing of historiography
is nonetheless important: Inasmuch as “Descriptive Psychics, or history” is classified as
belonging to the descriptive order of the psychical subclass of the “idioscopic” or “special
sciences,” it does not attempt to nomologically establish general laws (cf. EP 2: 261), nor
does it taxonomically study “kinds of mental manifestation” (CP 1.271), but rather aspires
“to  describe  individual  manifestations  of  mind,  whether  they  be  permanent  works or
actions” and “to explain them on the principles of psychology and ethnology” (CP 1.189,
emphases mine). We can thus say that history qua “Descriptive Psychics” is a form of
scientific  activity that focuses on the description of  individual  events in which mind
becomes  manifest  as a productive  power ,  incarnating  itself  in  the  materiality  of
“permanent  works”  and “actions.”  What  such a  mind is,  however,  and  how we  can
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account  for  its  poietical  and  practical  purposiveness  in  bringing  about  artifacts  and
practices, are questions another science has to answer: “to philosophy must fall the task
of comparing the two stems of causation and of exhuming their common root” (CP 1.273).
Thus, although there is no explicitly marked slot for the philosophy of history on Peirce’s
“ladder” of principle-dependent sciences “descending into the well of truth” (CP 2.119), it
is clear that there can be such a slot, if not a connection of several slots contributing to
the philosophical clarification of what history is.
6 In the connection of such architectonic stances, however, a third ‘ontotheological’ aspect
of Peirce’s philosophical interest in history must be taken into account, as it constitutes a
constant horizon in which history is conceived of as something that is not only grounded
in the sequentiality of events and, moreover, acquires degrees of directionality through
the categories of evolution operative in their connection, but also constitutes a medium of
the  expression  of  rationality  (cf.  EP 2:  245-5):  A  passage  from  How  To  Reason (1894)
stratifies  these three central  aspects  of  Peirce’s  philosophical  interest  in history and
provides us with its pre-conception as a [a] cooperative product of individuals bringing
about  civilization  with  [b] a  directionality  depending  on  the  degree  of  historical
awareness in their actions, [c] functioning as the medium of the self-revelation of the
Absolute.
[a]  To say  that  man accomplishes  nothing but  that  to  which his  endeavors  are
directed would be a cruel condemnation of the great bulk of mankind, who never
have leisure to labor for anything but the necessities of life for themselves and their
families.  [b] But, without directly striving for it,  far less comprehending it,  they
perform  all  that  civilization  requires,  and  bring  forth  another  generation  to
advance  history  another  step.  Their  fruit  is,  therefore,  collective;  it  is  the
achievement of  the whole people.  [c]  What is  it,  then,  that  the whole people is
about,  what  is  this  civilization  that  is  the  outcome  of  history,  but  is  never
completed?  […].  We  may  say  that  it  is  the  process  whereby  man,  with  all  his
miserable littlenesses, becomes gradually more and more imbued with the Spirit of
God, in which Nature and History are rife. (CP 5.402 n2)
7 In the light of these aspects and interpretive problems, we will first identify the origins of
central leitmotifs of Peirce’s philosophy of history in the early key text “The Place of Our
Age in the History of Civilization” (1863). This piece is deeply influenced by Schelling’s
notion of history as a “self-disclosing revelation of the absolute” (SW III: 603) and presents
us with a matrix of ideas outlining the metaphysical horizon and systematic interest in
and with which Peirce  will  concretize  his  philosophy of  history in  subsequent  years
(Section II). 
8 As  will  be  sketched  in  the  next  section,  this  concretization  takes  place  within  the
framework of  two complementary argumentative movements connecting “Fixation of
Belief” and “Evolutionary Love” in accordance with a scheme for the proof of objective
idealism which Schelling,  in his System of  Transcendental  Idealism  (1800)  – designed to
complement the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1797) – describes as follows:
In knowing as such – in the fact of my knowing – objective and subjective are so
united that one cannot say which of the two has priority. […] Hence there are only
two possibilities: A. Either the object is made primary, and the question is: how a
subject  is  annexed  thereto,  which  coincides  with  it?  […]  B.  Alternatively,  the
subjective is made primary, and the problem is: how an objective supervenes, which
coincides with it? If all knowledge rests upon the coincidence [Übereinstimmung] of
these  two,  then  the  problem  of  explaining  this  coincidence  is  undoubtedly  the
supreme problem for all knowledge. (SW III: 339-41)
“I Have To Confess I Cannot Read History So,”
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
4
9 Accordingly,  we  will  explore  an  interpretation  that  argues  for  a  complementaristic
reading: Whereas “Evolutionary Love” is the culmination of a cosmogonic account of the
phenomenon of  scientific  knowledge  which  moves  from the  analysis  of  the  objective
cosmological  conditions to  the  “historical  development  of  human  thought”  ( EP 1:  363),
resulting in the progress of scientific rationality (cf. EP 1: 369-71), “Fixation of Belief,” on
the  other  hand,  analyzes  an  inverse  movement  that  leads  us  from  the  subjective
representational conditions of embodied intelligences to the emergence of the idea of an
“external permanency” (EP 1: 120). The ensuing coincidence of the structure and results
of  these  two  movements  of  analysis  does  not  only  confirm  the  objective  idealist
hypothesis  of  a  processual  identity  of  the evolution of  nature and thought,  but  also
justifies our hope that both processes are expressions of one and the same grammar of
their intelligibility – “Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third”
(EP 1: 297) – and, therefore, grounded in a categoriological form of reality thus receiving
architectonic confirmation of its universality. It is only in the horizon of the coincidence
between the objective and subjective conditions of scientific knowledge revealed in this
circular  movement  that  history  can  be  pragmatically  conceived  of  as  a  normative
developmental  form  of  the  expression  of  rationality,  which  enables  our  ‘agent’s
knowledge’ to project empirical history as a progress towards an increasing self-control
over our future historical development (Section III). 
 
II. Early Leitmotifs of Peirce’s Philosophy of History
10 As we shall  see in this  section,  a  main perspective of  Peirce’s  philosophy of  history,
namely (i.) the conception of history as a medium of the absolute, originates in his first
public  speech  “The  Place  of  Our  Age  in  the  History  of  Civilization”  (1863).  “POA”
anticipates other leitmotifs of Peirce’s philosophy of history, to wit (ii.) the conception of
a universalist understanding of history, (iii.) the theme of history as a development of
reason  progressing  in  accordance  with  universal  categories  as  its  developmental
structure,  and  finally  (iv.)  the  necessity  of  a  normative  conception  of  history  as  a
cooperative  process  that  is  to  be  reflected  from  the  first-person  stance  of  ‘agent’s
knowledge.’ 
 
II.1 “The Place of Our Age in the History of Civilization”
11 Among the philosophies of history developed by German Idealists from 1780 to 1830, most
of  which were  inspired by  Herder’s  Ideas  for  the  Philosophy  of  the  History  of  Humanity
(1784-1791) and Kants’s “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim” (1784),
the  works  of  Schiller  and  Schelling  seem  to  have  had  a  bigger  impact  on  Peirce’s
conception of history than Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of  World History (1837) or
Fichte’s Fundamental Traits of the Present Age (1804-5). Whereas On the Æsthetic Education of
Man (1796) is known to be a major source for Peirce’s understanding of aesthetics7 and of
his  early  theory  of  categories,8 both  the  general  nature  and  specification  of  the
categoriological status of Schiller’s three drives – the formal, the sensuous and the play-
drive – as categorial moments of historical processes in the Letters XXIV to XXVII have
gained little attention in their relevance to Peirce; something similar might be said of
Schelling, inasmuch as the influence of his Naturphilosophie on Peirce’s metaphysics has
been adumbrated repeatedly,9 while the importance of his conception of the philosophy
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of history, as articulated in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) and the lecture
“The Historical Construction of Christianity” (1803), is a subject yet to be tackled.
12 From a sketch Peirce gives of  his juvenilia (1859-1864),  we can infer quite safely that
“POA” is rooted in the soil of his earliest speculations on the categories, which goes far
beyond  what  Kant  conceives of  as  the  objective  validity  of  his  “pure  concepts  of
synthesis”10 and represents the undertaking of an ‘historical deduction of the categories’
that thus aims “to solve the puzzle [of the categories] in a […] historical […] manner” (CP
 1.563). As the Peircean scheme of categories does, by that time, already comprise two
“distinct orders of categories,” namely “the particular and the universal” (EP 2: 148), we
are  confronted  with  a  scheme  in  which  the  latter  are  conceptualized  as  universal
developmental stages that are connected by the former as their particular disjunctive
“phases of evolution” (EP 2: 143, 148). This categoriological scheme will reappear in all
texts we are studying.11 
13 “POA” could be read as originating in and resulting from the combination of two central
ideas of Schelling’s philosophy of history:12 The notion of a “historical construction of
Christianity,” which is intimately connected with a representational conception of the
Absolute, and his reflections on the possibility to conceive of history as a play (Schauspiel, 
SWIII: 602) of the “gradually self-disclosing revelation of the absolute” (SWIII: 603).13
 
II.1.1 History as Drama and Revelation of the Absolute
14 In the chapter of the System of Transcendental Idealism devoted to the “Deduction of the
Concept of History,” Schelling presents us with a drama in which everyone performs their
role  according to  their  preferences.  A reasonable  development  in such a  play would
become conceivable only under the assumption that the mind of the playwright – the
author of history – would have coordinated the roles beforehand, thus guaranteeing a
harmony  between  the  free  play  of  the  actors  and  the  necessity  constituting  the
intelligibility of a narrative (SW III: 602). 
15 In agreement with this train of thought, “POA” sets out to solve its central question – is it
possible to conceive of the “spirit of Scepticism and Irreverence” of the “Age or Reason”
as an integral  element and “work of  Christianity” (W 1:  101-7)? – by introducing the
dramatic stages of plot-development (cf. W 1:108) as temporal schemata of the historical
synthesis  of  the  absolute.  Having  differentiated  six  stages  of  dramatic  development,
Peirce thus immediately invites us to “see if Christianity, the plot of History, does not
follow determinate laws in its development, so that from a consideration of them we can
gather where we are and whither we are tending” (W 1: 108, emphasis mine). It will be the
categories  that,  functioning  as  “determinate  laws”  of  development,  constitute  the
historicity of our ‘agent’s knowledge.’
16 Schelling’s use of drama as an analogy for history does, however, not stop where we have
left it. It is only through careful observation of the next stage of Schelling’s analogy that
his conception of a radically historical absolute comes to light and reveals its affinity to
the Taylorian conception of ‘agent’s knowledge’ as an “achievement” (cf. fn. 4), inasmuch
as “the very play of our own freedom” (SW III: 602) as agents in the drama of history
would certainly require more creativity and sense of responsibility if we were to assume
that  the  author  had  no  independent  existence  apart  from the  play.  Thus,  Schelling
argues, the author would be “only successively revealing himself through the very play of
our own freedom,” so that, “without this freedom even he himself would not be,” whereas
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“we,”  on the  other  hand,  were  to  be  “coauthors  [Mitdichter]  of  the  whole,  and self-
inventors [Selbsterfinder] of the peculiar role we play” (SW III: 602, translation mine). 
17 Thus, we see how, in Schelling’s conception of history, human freedom is conceived as the
medium of a successive revelation of the absolute. This revelation takes place in the three
historical periods of “Destiny,” “Nature” and “Providence” (SW III: 603-4; cf. SW V: 209ff.);
but  only when,  in an indefinite future,  the last  period will  have begun,  so Schelling
concludes his “Deduction of the Concept of History,” “God also will then exist” (SW III:
604). 
18 The aim of “POA” – to offer an historical outlook within which our “Age of Reason” can be
grasped as a necessary stage toward the revelation of its true religious essence in the
apotheosis of scientific rationality on the subsequent historical stage – is obtained by
presenting the outlines of an “æsthetic view of science” (W 1: 114) and the conception of
creation enshrined in it. With this vision of history and its goal, Peirce obviously does not
appear  to  be  primordially  committed  to  the  ideas  of  the  progress  of  moral  agency,
political institutions and their constitutional framework, which are at the heart of the
metaphysics of freedom in the tradition of Kant’s “Idea for a universal History”;14 rather
it seems that Peirce conceives of the “æsthetic view of science” as a Weltanschauung, in
which the scientific understanding of creation as an agapic process will collaterally also
yield “the lever of love to move the world” and thus unleash more “surplus energy in the
business of philanthropy” as has so far been used on “our triumphant road to wooing
things” (W 1: 112-3). 
19 Connecting the concerto grosso scientiarum Peirce stages at the end of his speech to the
Schellingian notion of human freedom as the medium of a historical “revelation of the
Absolute” (SW III: 603), we can see the denouement of Peirce’s “æsthetic view of science” to
consist of the notion of a co-authorship of man – who “may impress nature with his own
intellect,  converse  and  not  merely  listen”  (W 1:  113)  –  with  the  creator:  This  co-
authorship is a reflection of the original harmony of creation manifesting itself in the
“majestic symphony” resulting from the cooperation of the sciences, in which “one as
viol, another as flute, another as trump” translates the modulations of the divine agápe
into the scientific knowledge of an object envisaged as a “cosmos”:
When the conclusion of our age comes, and scepticism and materialism have done
their perfect work, we shall have a far greater faith than ever before. For then man
will see God’s wisdom and mercy, not only in every event of his own life, but in that
of the gorilla, the lion, the fish, the polyp, the tree, the crystal, the grain of dust, the
atom. He will see that each one of these has an inward existence of its own, for
which God loves it, and that He has given to it a nature of endless perfectibility. He
will see the folly of saying that nature was created for his use […]. Physics will have
made us familiar with the body of all things, and the unity of the body of all; natural
history  will  have  shown  us  the  soul  of  all  things  in  their  infinite  and  amiable
idiosyncracies. Philosophy will have taught us that it is this all which constitutes
the church. (W 1: 114)
20 Let us summarize and then put this last quotation into perspective: Following Schelling,
as soon as 1863, Peirce conceives of history as an ongoing “revelation of the Absolute.”
This revelation proceeds in three stages, in which the Schellingian Absolute – being the
ground of the identity of subject and object, mind and matter, freedom and necessity (cf.
SW III: 600) – appears first as “destiny, i.e. as a wholly blind force” (SW III: 604), which, for
Peirce, corresponds to the “arbitrarily imagined perfection” of the “egotistical stage” (W
 1: 113). –, then, as “nature,” i.e. as the idea of a law-governed mechanical order – which,
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in “POA,” corresponds to the “idistical stage” on which perfection is “observed” (W 1:
113). Finally, the Schellingian Absolute will eventually appear as “providence,” i.e. as a
process of revelation in which man conceives of nature and history as the expressions of
an Absolute that has the formal condition of its manifestation in the processuality of its
revelation and is thus radically historical and of the nature of a representation (SW III: 604,
and cf. 601-2). 
21 But the very moment this Absolute were to have completed its revelation so that the
objective world would then be (and nolonger become) “a complete manifestation of God” (
eine vollkommene Darstellung Gottes, SW III: 603), a state of absolute determination would be
reached – corresponding to the “absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system in
which mind is at last crystallized” in Peirce’s “Cosmogonic Philosophy” (EP 1: 297). In this
state, Schelling argues, “nothing could be other than the way it is” (SW III: 603) and the
spontaneous and the necessary, freedom and necessity, would have become identical (cf.
SW III: 340-1). Finally, Peirce’s æstheic view of science, which is conceived as the last stage
preceding the tuistical  stage of  revelation,  presents  us  with a  vision of  the Absolute
rooted  in  the  idea  of  mankind’s  cooperative  and  sympathetic  co-authorship  in  the
historical process of its revelation. The manifestation of the Absolute as a “cosmos” in the
synergy of scientific work, however, is not independent of the semeiotic process of its
representation. It only reveals itself in our semeiosis, thus acting as the horizon in which
a maximal degree of ‘agent’s knowledge’ becomes attainable for us.15
 
II.1.2 History as Absolute Synthesis
22 For both Schelling and Peirce,  the historicity  and semeioticity  of  the Absolute are a
consequence of its deep dialogical structure, reflected in the very notion of revelation.
Peirce’s basic Schellingian assumption – that the history of our freedom is the medium of
revelation of the Absolute and can be compared to a play, the author of which has no
other  manifestation  besides  –  leads  him to  a  proto-semeiotic  notion  of  history  as  a
process of representation that develops in accordance to “determinate laws” (W 1: 109),
specified as categoriological “laws of […] objective presentation” (W 1: 109) expressing
general conditions of intelligibility: “Every object is obliged to appear under a certain set
of forms” (W 1: 109), Peirce writes at the beginning of his ‘categoriological construction of
Christianity.’ 
23 In  this  construction,  Peirce  lays  down the “formula of  Christianity”  (W 1:  113)  –  the
proposition “The Church is the Kingdom of Heaven” (W 1: 110) – as the starting-point of a
gradual revelation of the total semantic contents of the idea of Christianity. Accordingly,
the deductive plan contained in those central sections of the text that are lost (they were
not  published in the Cambridge  Chronicle,  which instead notifies  its  readers  that  “the
orator here proceeded to analyze the formula ‘The Church is the Kingdom of Heaven’ and
endeavored to show what part each had played in its enunciation” (W 1: 110)) becomes
clear:
[a] First there was the egotistical stage when man arbitrarily imagined perfection,
now is the idistical stage when he observes it. Hereafter must be the more glorious
tuistical stage when he shall be in communion with her. And this is exactly what,
step by step,  we are coming to.  [b] For if  you will  recur a moment to my draw
analysis of the formula of Christianity, you will perceive that the conclusions of the
preceding ages have answered three kinds of questions concerning that proposition. [ba] 
Two were metaphysical, what is its predicate and what is its subject? [bb] two were
dynamical; is it hypothetical or actual, and is it categorical or conditional? [bc] two
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were mathematical; what is its quality, and what is its quantity? [bd] And now there
are questions of but one kind more that remain to be asked, and they are physical.
And they are two. The first is, is christianity a fact of consciousness merely, or one
of the external world? And this shall be answered by the conclusion of our own age.
The second is,  is the predicate true to the understanding merely,  or also to the
sense? And this, if we may look forward so far, will be answered by Christ’s coming
to rule his kingdom in person. And when that occurs, religion will no longer be
presented objectively, but we shall receive it by direct communication with him. (W
1: 113ff., additions in brackets and all italics mine)
24 In this passage, Peirce answers the question raised in the title of his speech by connecting
the three stages of revelation with a categoriological movement reminiscent of Kant’s
four types of principles of the understanding (CPR, B 201n.f ). He thus relates (1) eight ages
with (2) the three stages of revelation of the Absolute, which are connected by (5) eight
categories  that  (4)  answer  four  types  of  categoriological  questions,  and  are  (3)
schematized as moments of dramatic development. We may put these correlations in the
following table:
1. Age 2. Stage
3. Dramatic 
Schema16
4. Question 5. Category
Heathens & Jews egotistical prologue metaphysical predicate









Modern Nations  passion in full operation  
categorical – 
conditional
Crusades  counterplot mathematical quality
Reformation  idea in material effects  quantity
Reason idistical conclusion physical
internal – 
external
Future age tuistical soliloquy  
ens rationis –
ens realis
25 Now, we might be willing to accept the idea that history is “the gradually self-disclosing
revelation  of  the  absolute”  as  a  postulate  that  aims  to  ascribe  maximal  solidarity,
cooperativity, circumspection and responsibility to rational agents for the use of their
freedom in the historical development of rational purposes that are embodied within
nature and culture (cf. CP 1.615). Still, a question needs to be addressed: In which sense
can history be seen as developing by ‘answering categoriological questions’? The answer,
I  think,  lies in the difficulties connected to a normative component ingrained in our
conception  of  history,  according  to  which,  as  Schelling  puts  it,  “history  ought  to
represent  freedom  and  necessity  in  unification”  (SW III:  593):  Neither  a  strictly
predetermined anancastic sequence of events representing a “system of fatalism” (SW III:
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601), nor a tychastic progression resulting from mere chance – “a system of irreligiosity and
atheism” (ibid.), as Schelling calls it – can be considered to be historical. Only a view that
allows  us  to  conceive  of  an  absolute  ground  of  the  harmony  between  freedom and
necessity, so Schelling argues, will allow us to conceive of history in the first place. Such a
history is “a system of providence, or religion in the only proper sense of the word” (ibid.)
and – as we might anticipate: agapastic (cf. III.3) – the product of an “absolute synthesis” (
SW III: 602), which, as such, can never be completed without negating the appearance of
freedom in the world (cf. SW III: 270). 
26 The view of the Absolute as historical, so Schelling argues in “The Historical Construction
of Christianity” (1805), emerges with Christianity as the worldview in which “the world is
looked upon as History, as a moral kingdom” (SW V: 287).17 With Christianity, thus, the
Absolute as the ground of unity of the finite and infinite, the divine and the natural,
necessity and freedom, represents itself in the new symbolism of historical action:
Where the infinite itself can become finite, there it can also become plurality; there
polytheism is possible. Where the infinite is only signified by the finite, it remains
necessarily one, and no polytheism as a co-existence of divine forms is possible. […]
Consequently, Christianity can be taken only from that which falls in time, that is,
from History; and, hence, Christianity is, in the highest sense and in its innermost
spirit, historical. Every particular moment of time is a revelation of a particular side
of God, in each of which He is absolute: that which the Greek religion had as co-
existent, Christianity has as a succession. (SW III: 288)
27 The Christian God here appears as the totality of historical time; but as the “endlessness
and immensity” of history render it incapable of providing us with a representation of
God, it becomes necessary “to represent history in a both infinite and limited appearance,
which itself is not real, as the political state is, but ideal, and represents the unity of all
[human beings] in spirit, their individual segregation notwithstanding, as an immediate
presence” (SW V: 293). This representation is “the church,” which Schelling conceives of
as a “living work of art” (ibid.), adding strong æsthetic connotations to the Kantian origins
of this concept.18 
28 In  the  central  section  of  the  argumentatio of  “POA”  (cf.  W 1:  108-10),  we  see  Peirce
embarking on an attempt to deliver that detailed construction of Christianity, of which
Schelling had only demonstrated “the possibility in general” (SW V: 295). That the subject
of Peirce’s formula of Christianity is the Church and has its predicate in the notion of a
“heavenly kingdom,” which consummated the condition of being “perfection in human
form”  with  the  life  of  Christ  (cf.  W 1:  110),  thus  becomes  intelligible  after  having
considered  the  Schellingian  backgrounds  of  the  speech:  The  church  is  a  growing
cooperative community attracted by a goal it  is destined to in its predicate,  which it
gradually makes clearer to itself in its history. The categories of the revelation of its
predicate, therefore, are moments of a synthesis of the Absolute in the medium of
history, directing us from the first stage of revelation to an eschatological end we can
only approach in history (cf. W 1: 114). 
 
III. Developments: “The Fixation of Belief” and
“Evolutionary Love” 
29 In this section we will trace the further development of Peirce’s philosophy of history by
focusing on two quite remote networks of ideas: Whereas “Fixation of Belief” (1877) and
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its twin “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” were written to introduce the readers of the
Popular Science Monthly to a series of articles entitled Illustrations of the Logic of Science
(1877-8), in which Peirce, for the first time, developed his theory of inquiry within the
broader horizon of a set of themes and tenets that, two decades later, became canonical
for  the  pragmatistic  movement,  “Evolutionary  Love”  (1893)  is  part  of  a  speculative
“Cosmogonic Philosophy” (EP 1: 297) Peirce outlined in his socalled ‘Monist Metaphysical
Series’ (1891-3). 
30 In this cosmogony, Peirce develops a categoriologically founded account of the whole of
reality,  including minds  sharing an interest  in  cosmogony,  as  having evolved in  the
process of a “natural history of the laws of nature” (EP 1: 246, 288) that originates from a
state  of  absolute  chaotic  potentiality  and  –  by  mere  chance  –  actualizes  possible
developmental paths through a “generalizing tendency” (EP 1:  297) of habit-taking, in
which regularities and uniformities like laws of nature or the directionality of cultural
processes begin to emerge. Unless, that is, in an infinitely remote future, a final state of
complete rationalization of the cosmic system is reached and mind – being the habit-
taking agency of the universe – becomes “crystallised” as “effete mind” (EP 1: 297, 293).
The origins of this narrative in Schelling’s philosophy become obvious when they are
couched  in  a  theological  language  that  reveals  a  significant  continuity  with  the
metaphysical narrative of “POA”: 
The  starting-point  of  the  universe,  God  the  Creator,  is  the  Absolute  First;  the
terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every
state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third. (EP 1:251)
31 Still, as it is far from trivial to identify a point of convergence between the philosophical
interests and methodological approaches that characterize the writings of two series –
which have even been deemed to be incompatible19 – it comes as no surprise that “for
some early commentators the whole idea of  a Peircean system of metaphysics was a
puzzling  embarrassment,”  as  Hookway  (1997:  2)  succinctly  puts  it.20 Upon  closer
inspection, however, the distant phases to which “FOB” and “ELO” belong turn out to be
consecutive in the mental biography of someone who, moreover, cultivated cosmological
interests  from the start.21 Thus,  as  soon as  1885,  Peirce writes  to  W. James to  “have
something very vast now,” namely “an attempt to explain the laws of nature, to show
their general characteristics and to trace them to their origin & predict new laws by the law
of the laws of nature” (W 6: 595; emphasis mine). Consequently, as a close reading of the
opening sections of the Monist Series confirms, the interest in the explanation of the
possibility  of  hypothesis-framing  reflects  a  central  heuristic  aspect  that  Peirce’s
“Cosmogonic Philosophy” shares with his logic of science.  Consequently,  after having
sketched  his  theory  of  a  rational  instinct,  according  to  which  the  success  of  early
scientists  to  select  hypotheses  in accordance with the criterium of  simplicity  can be
explained by considering that and how embodied minds have been shaped by the very
laws they have become able to divinate (EP 1: 287-8, cf. EP 1: 181), Peirce writes:
[a] To find out much more about molecules and atoms we must search out a natural
history of laws of nature which may fulfill  that function which the presumption in
favor of simple laws fulfilled in the early days of dynamics, [aa] by showing us what
kind of laws we have to expect and [ab] by answering such questions as this: Can we,
with  reasonable  prospect  of  not  wasting  time,  try  the  supposition  that  atoms
attract one another inversely as the seventh power of their distances, or can we
not? [b] To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the mind and
yet having no reason for their special  forms, but standing inexplicable and irrational,  is
hardly a justifiable position. [c] Uniformities are precisely the sort of facts that need
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to be accounted for […]. Law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason. Now
the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature...is to suppose them results of
evolution. (EP 1: 288, additions in squared brackets and italics mine)
32 Peirce here states that the program of his architectonic philosophy is motivated by two
interdependent concerns: First, the need to find a functional substitute for the heuristic
power of the principle of simplicity, which would [aa] enable us to hypothetically derive
specific laws from a ‘law of laws,’ and thus second [ab] provide us with a criterium for
testing hypotheses efficiently. The concerns [aa] and [ab], however, make it imperative to
have a theory of  the diversification of  the special  forms of  laws of  nature and their
relation to the law of laws if we do not want to lose all grounds for assuming the general
intelligibility of  nature,  which would be the case if  we were to claim [b]: a  radically
unsystematic empiricism that merely postulates general lawfulness without being able to
account for the relation that needs to be thought as obtaining between general lawfulness
and its specifications.22 The concerns [aa] and [ab], thus, necessitate us to offer an account
of the grounds of the general intelligibility of nature, from which, then, the lawfulness of
the special laws would become intelligible to us in the first place. Such an account, Peirce
says, needs to be evolutionary.23 
 
III.1 The Structure of “The Fixation of Belief”
33 The structural  analysis of  “FOB” reveals a symmetry:  After an episodic sketch of  the
history  of  the  empirical  sciences,  the  sections  II-IV  introduce  the  basic  concepts  of
Peirce’s theory of inquiry by outlining the archetypical pragmatistic epistemic situation
in which an organism is primordially related to its environment through biological needs,
emotional  responses  and conceptual  dispositions  to act.  The normative grounding of
inquiry, however, has so far only been involved embryonically, especially in a momentous
reference  to  the  role  of  reflection  (EP 1:  114).  This  normative  grounding  will  be
articulated in section V, where a second narrative sequentially introducing four methods
of fixating belief leads to the emergence of scientific rationality and its apotheosis in the
“integrity of belief” (EP 1: 123). On the whole then, this structuring presents a triptych:
Two narratives are mediated through the theory of inquiry. The unity of the text thus
consists in its giving an answer to the question ‘What conception of logical thought is
needed to account for scientific progress?’ 
34 There is, however, another possible analysis: We can read “FOB” as a sequence of three
narratives soaked with theory that disclose three aspects of history: In its firstness (in its
being what it is without reference to anything else),24 history is chronicled as a mere
sequence of monadic events and agents (sec. I). In its secondness (in its being what it is as
determined by something else), history is resulting from a blind evolutionary process in
which  “logical  animals”  (EP 1:  112)  are  forced  to  react to  the  challenges  of  their
environment (sec. II-IV). In its thirdness (in its being what it is as mediating between a
first and a second) and third degree of clearness, 25 history eventually is projected as a
gradual realization of the conceptual moments of scientific rationality (sec. V). With this
approach – and the conception of an ideal history (cf. 1.60) enshrined within it – Peirce
follows a tradition that can be traced back to Fichte’s conception of a “pragmatic history
of the human mind,” articulated in his 1794 Science of Knowledge,26 that with its emphasis
on  the  dialectical  actuosity  obtaining  between  Ego  and  Non-Ego  in  the  genesis  of
subjectivity,  not only inspires the philosophy of history in Schiller’s Æsthetic Letters –
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which Peirce remembers as his first philosophical reading (cf. 2.197) leaving an “indelible
impression upon my soul” (MS 619: 10) – but also informs the conception of “Philosophy
as  a  History  of  Self-Consciousness  in  Epochs”  in  Schelling’s  System  of  Transcendental
Idealism (1800) that, through excerpts and paraphrases in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria
(1817),27 had  become  part  and  parcel  of  the  Concord  Transcendentalism  Peirce
remembers to be the origin of his “Schelling-fashioned idealism” (EP 1: 312).28 A decade
before Hegel’s Phenomenology, Schiller and Schelling thus are among the first idealists to
emphasize the historicity of reason by conceiving of it as a process of education in which
the static faculties of Kant’s first Critique – which closes with a chapter on “The History of
Pure Reason” merely to “designate a place that is left open in the system and must be
filled in the future” (A852/B880) – are interpreted as stages of the historical becoming of
reason. On this backdrop, “FOB” answers a question which complements the first: What
philosophical conception of history will allow us to conceive of ourselves as historically
capable of gaining increasing control over the development of rationality by studying
logic as “an art not yet reduced to rules” (EP 1: 141)? 
 
III.2 The Sequence of Methods and Transitions: Peirce’s Analytic
Program
35 The sequence of four methods of belief-fixation is introduced to test their respective
conformity with the normative principle of belief-formation (NPBF). As Peirce indicates in
section IV,  this  principle,  which should regulate  all  rational  processes  of  reflectively
turning – not to the sensuous matter of inquiry, but – to the procedural mode of belief-
formation, “will make us reject any belief which does not seem to have been so formed as to
insure this result” (EP 1: 114, emphasis mine): This result is to produce beliefs which can
(i.) “truly guide our actions,” (ii.) “so as to” (iii.) “satisfy our desires.” Reflection thus
monitors – and in case of a violation of norms, inhibits – the process of belief-formation
under the profile of the question whether a belief has been produced in such a way that it
meets the conditions to be (i.)  irrevocably authoritative (ii.)  to establish a relation of
functionality (iii.) among our beliefs and aims of action. Inasmuch as NPBF – as a principle
that does not state what our goal is, but only which form it requires – thus sets the norm
that all  our beliefs ought to be formed in a certain way so as to guarantee the most
fundamental requirement for the practical identity of an agent, namely the possibility of
the continuity of its actions,29 section V, consequently, assigns itself the task to assess which
methods of generating and stabilizing belief are in accordance with this principle and,
therefore, practically rational.
36 Irrespective of Peirce’s literary style, there is a dense analytic program underlying the
description of each of the four methods and three transitions.30 This analysis progresses
towards two goals, in which the accomplishment of the first depends on the second: (A.)
to differentiate the developmental stages of the unfolding of man’s second nature as being
rooted in a capacity to acquire and modify complexes of habits, and (B.) to give an account
of the necessity of the form (and thus: lawfulness) of this development by identifying the
principle  of  its  movement and  thus  provide  a  justification  for  the  specification  of  its
moments qua particular developmental stages, which is required for accomplishing the
first task. 
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III.3 A Categoriologically Grounded Interpretation of Section V of
“Fixation of Belief”
37 As we can here only sketch the close reading that becomes possible when we conceive of
“ELO” as a complement to “FOB,” let me immediately refer you to the passage that holds
the key both for the reconstruction of the sequence of methods as categoriologically
derived moments and for the explanation of their unity and form through a principle that
specifies the origin,  growth and télos of  the development they constitute:  In the third
section  of  “ELO”  we  see  Peirce  applying  the  general modes  of  evolution  he  has
categoriologically differentiated to the “historical development of human thought,” thus
obtaining a tychistic mode, “two varieties of anancasm” and “three of agapasm” (EP 1:
363). He writes:
[o] In the very nature of things, the line of demarcation between the three modes of
evolution is not perfectly sharp. That does not prevent its being quite real, perhaps
it is rather a mark of its reality […]. The main question is whether three radically
different evolutionary elements have been operative; and […] what are the most
striking  characteristics  of  whatever  elements  have  been  operative  […].  The  [a]
agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies, not
[aa] altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly by [aba] the mere force
of circumstances or [abb] of logic, as [ab] in anancasm, but [b] by an immediate
attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it,
by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of mind; and this
mental tendency may be of three varieties, as follows. First,  [ba] it may affect a
whole people or community in its collective personality, and be thence communicated
to such individuals as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with the collective
people, although they may be intellectually incapable of attaining the idea by their
private understandings or even perhaps of consciously apprehending it.  Second,
[bb]  it  may  affect  a  private  person directly,  yet  so  that  he  is  only  enabled  to
apprehend the idea, or to appreciate its attractiveness, by virtue of his sympathy
with his neighbors, under the influence of a striking experience or development of
thought. The conversion of St. Paul may be taken as an example of what is meant.
Third, [bc] it may affect an individual,  independently of his human affections, by
virtue  of  an  attraction  it  exercises  upon  his  mind,  even  before  he  has
comprehended it. This is the phenomenon which has been well called the divination
of genius; for it is due to the continuity between the man’s mind and the Most High.
(EP 1: 364, additions in brackets and all italicizations except the last are mine)
38 I shall first briefly show how this passage allows us to understand the categoriological
nature of the distinctions Peirce draws in “FOB” (III.3.1). Then I will adumbrate in how far
‘that-which-first-manifests-itself-as-the-social-impulse’ functions as the principle of the
internal development – i.e. as the origin, growth and télos – of the impulse’s manifestation
in three stages (III.3.2). As we will see, Peirce is first retroactively establishing a seamless
correspondence between the methods of belief-fixation and the modes of the historical
development of thought ontologically grounding them (cf. [a]-[bc]), and then proceeding
to account for the internal unity and categoriological order of the three manifestations of
the social impulse as concretizations of the modes of agapic historical development (cf.
[ba]-[bc]). In this perspective, thus, the methods of tenacity, authority and pure reason
are conceived of as degenerate forms of the method of science, whereas tychistic and
anancastic agapic evolution reveal themselves to be degenerate forms of “divination” (cf.
[bc]).
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III.3.1 The Methods of Belief-Fixation are Praxeological Manifestations of the
Evolutionary modes of the development of Human Thought Cosmologically
Grounding them
39 The claim that the objective relation man is capable of establishing between him and the
world through science is grounded in practices and social relations among human beings,
is the explicit epistemological theme of “FOB”: we establish our relation to an objective
realm we call ‘reality’ or ‘the world we share’ by entering and entertaining definite social
– i.e. cooperative – relations to others. The claim that the objective relation that man is
capable of establishing to reality via scientific inquiries, is the upshot of a development in
which mind – as a communicative agency unfolding from a “social impulse” – has the
tendency  to  develop  in  accordance  to  a  categoriologically  ordered  sequence,  is  the
implicit metaphysical theme of Peirce’s philosophy of history in “FOB,” culminating in the
temporal  schematization  of  a  categoriological  analysis  of  the  moments  of  scientific
rationality in section V: A conceptual sequence is schematized in a dramatic form in
order to idealiter present methods of fixating belief as distinct complex sets of habits that
realiter are not sharply demarcated, but – being simultaneously operative types of causes of
historical processes – do, rather, overlap (cf. [o]).
40 The description of the method of tenacity does thus not mean to imply that there are real
historical individuals who are capable of exclusively following the method of tenacity in
their belief-forming-procedures by voluntaristically determining their beliefs in order to
then cut themselves off from all communication with others and the world by selectively
perceiving and hearing what confirms their beliefs and,  as a last resort,  rejecting all
requests to abide by standards of rationality as a request to use standards that are not
their own (cf.  EP 1:  116).  We also resist  the temptation to conceive of the method of
tenacity  as  an  independently  existing31 “historical  state  of  culture  […]  [in  which]  one
opinion does not influence another” and men “cannot put two and two together,” as
Peirce characterizes its essence two pages later (EP 1: 118).32 Rather, we understand that
this  method  aims  to  capture  the  internal  bond  of  certain  attitudes,  practices  and
economies  inherent  in  routines  of  belief-production  which,  both  on  the  onto-  and
phylogenetic  level,  are  verifiable  as  the  dominating  factors  periodically determining
phases  of  personal  and  cultural  development.  Moreover,  we  understand  that  these
practices have an unrestricted autonomy at their core which, when pushed to its extremes,
will result in the complete absence of rule-governed forms of fixating and reflectively
assessing belief. Of course, these rule-governed forms have yet to develop; but they cannot
develop without having the act of logical determination in its firstness as its prerequisite:
“[W]e cling tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe”
(EP 1: 114). What emerges on the stage of tenacity, thus, is the intent to determine one’s
self by determining one’s beliefs: the most fundamental condition of any form of logical
determination or practical identity. Here and in what follows, Peirce does not base his
analysis on “purported fact[s] about our psychological make-up.”33 The taking control of
their processes of belief-formation by organisms praxeologically requires their autonomy.
Consequently, Peirce emphasizes that tenacity, considered in isolation from the other
methods, is a praxeological fiction:34 it is “unable to hold its ground in practice” as “the
social impulse is against it” (EP 1: 116).
41 In correspondence with the method of tenacity, the tychistic mode of evolution is held to
be capable of reigning a historical process only for a limited time, insofar as this mode
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occurs “whenever we find men’s thought taking by imperceptible degrees a turn contrary
to the purposes which animate them, in spite of their highest impulses” (EP 1: 365). As a
result, this mode – like the tenacious method cosmologically grounded within it – will
effectuate “slight  departures from habitual  ideas in different  directions indifferently,
quite purposeless and quite unconstrained whether by outward circumstances or by force
of logic” (EP 1: 363), thus establishing a practice of “heedlessly” (EP 1: 364) fixating beliefs,
i.e. without any concern for general standards and the well-being of others. 
42 As Peirce impatiently exclaims in “ELO,” we surely cannot understand ourselves and our
history on the basis of the supposedly exclusive action of absolute chance: “I have to
confess I cannot read history so” (EP 1: 365). As much as the method of tenacity has the
social impulse against it, it is correspondingly not possible that “tychasm” – note Peirce’s
slip from talk of a mode of evolution to talk of a method – “has been the sole method [sic!]
of intellectual development,” inasmuch as such a development “has seldom been of a
tychastic nature, and exclusively in backward and barbarising movements” (EP 1: 365).
Cooperation and communication reign in the historical world we inhabit, thus indicating
the operativeness of a “real entitative »spirit« of an age or of a people” (EP 1: 365).
43 Is the social impulse really the “psychological property of human beings, [that] we cannot
hold on to beliefs that other people confidently deny”?35 Peirce’s argumentation points to
a different meaning: the upshot of the social impulse is that men as historical beings
“necessarily  influence  each  other’s  opinions”  (EP 1:  118),  inasmuch  as  the  most
fundamental  practices  –  especially  the  semeiotic-communicative  ones  –  are rule-
governed. The social impulse, then, is primarily an instinctive openness to coordinate and
communicate, a capacity to have our thoughts influenced by others; only secondarily is it
a form of pressure to accept the views of others, as this presupposes the recognition that
“another man’s thoughts or sentiment may be equivalent to one’s own” and “arises from
an impulse too strong in men to be suppressed, without danger of destroying the human
species,” i.e. the recognition arises from the social impulse as a first manifestation of a
transactional  instinct  to  coordinate,  cooperate  and  communicate  (EP 1:  116-7;  my
emphasis).  Without  this  impulse  then,  men,  passing  on  their  experiences  through
mediatic  practices  from  generation  to  generation,  would  never  become  part  of  the
collective process of experience they most naturally dwell in. 
44 The social impulse, originating from the transactional-communicative instinct is the origo
of all histories and communities. Like the agápe generating the “agapastic development of
thought,”  this  impulse  is  neither  autonomous (like  tenacity  as  the  praxeological
manifestation of the tychastic mode of thought-development, cf. [aa]) nor heteronomous
(as the methods of authority and pure reason qua manifestations of the two anancastic
modes,  cf.  [aba]36 and  [abb]37),  but  heautonomous38 (like  the  self-correcting  method of
science qua embodiment of the agapic mode; cf. [bc]) or: ‘inventive in giving to itself rules
for the reflection of itself.’ 
45 We are thus invited to conceive of the methods of authority and the apriori method as
those sets of habits of belief-determination in its secondness that are expressions of the
two varieties of the anancastic development of thought, in which, generally, “new ideas
are adopted without foreseeing whither they tend” and have the specific character to be
“determined by causes either external to the mind […] or internal” (EP1: 364), whereas
the method of science corresponds to the agapistic mode and is “distinguished by its
purposive character,” consisting in the “development of an idea” (EP1: 369). 
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III.3.2 The Manifestations of the Social Impulse are Categoriological
Concretizations of the Agapic Modes of the Development of Thought 
46 The categoriologically structured ideal history of scientific rationality Peirce develops in
section V of “FOB” makes intelligible the scientific progress sketched in its first section.
We thus see the tenacity with which Roger Bacon holds on to the concept of interior
illumination at the threshold of modern science, move to the ideas of the authoritarian
Francis Bacon, who “wrote on science like a Lord Chancellor,” cross the apriorism of the
Copernican Revolution, which almost prevented Kepler from testing the hypothesis of
elliptical orbits (cf. EP 1: 110), and reach the experimentalism of Lavoisier, whose new
habit was “to conceive of reasoning as something which was to be done with one’s eyes
open” (EP 1:  111).  Darwin,  Clausius and Maxwell,  eventually,  engender a new form of
statistical  control  over  natural  phenomena in  which a  cross-fertilization  of  methods
emerges and announces the possibility of a method of devising methods of inquiry – a
pragmatic “method of methods” required for “the age of method.”39 Our categoriological
scheme thus allows us to pragmatically conceive of our history as the unfolding of an
increasing control over the development of the scientific life-form we have become.
47 Is it possible to offer a cosmological account of the origin, growth and télos of our interest
in our history? Are there resources to account for the development of the transactional-
communicative instinct that manifests itself (i.) as “the social impulse” (EP 1: 116), then
(ii.) as “a wider sort of social feeling” (EP 1: 117) and finally (iii.) as the desire to have our
beliefs determined by “nothing human” (EP 1: 120)? Note that the qualitative changes from
method to method would be impossible if the propellant of the movement were not itself
capable  of  development:  Each  method  has  been  grounded  in  a  corresponding
evolutionary mode of the development of thought (cf. III.3.1), but a cosmogonic account
that shows how these modes themselves evolve from each other as diversifications of a
unifying principle is still missing. 
48 It is exactly here that Peirce’s “law of love” (EP 1: 362) and the differentiation of three
modes of the agapic historical development of thought (cf. [b]-[bb]) become relevant. As
this account is carefully prepared in what Peirce, especially in “The Law of Mind” (1892),
has to say about the mathematical  form of experience (cf.  EP 1:  323-7),  the semeiotic
structures  and  inferential  forms  of  psychic  processes  (cf.  EP 1:  327-9),  and  the
developmental stages of personality and communication (cf. EP 1: 330-3, 348-51), we can
here  only  sketch  the  objective  cosmological  account  of  the  evolution  of  the  social
impulse.
49 1) Whereas the growth of the social impulse in “FOB” is represented as the development
of  a  reflexive  activity  culminating  in  a  thematization  of  the  grounds  of  the
generalizability of the motives of our beliefs,40 the term reflection41 is avoided in the 1890s
and substituted with an inferentialistic account of thought (generally predilected since
the 1860s). 
50 2) In order to appreciate in which sense Peirce’s – often neglected42 – account of the three
modes of agapic development of thought (cf. [b]-[bc]) represents the key to understanding
the  origin,  growth  and  télos,  thus:  the  unity and  principle  of  diversification  of  the
development of the social impulse, it is crucial to understand the common nature of the
agapic modes: Their generic distinctive mark consists of their having the attractivity of
an idea as the ground of the “adoption of a mental tendency.” In the characterization of
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genuine agapic development (cf.  [b] and [bc]),  however, Peirce speaks of “an immediate
attraction for the idea itself” (my italics) emphasizing that the idea is apprehended for no
other reason but its sheer attractivity.  In accordance with Peirce’s distinction of three
inferential “modes of action of the human soul” (EP 1: 327-9), this attractivity consists in
abductively bringing formerly discrete elements into an unexpected continuum and thus
reflects  the  pure  mediality of  the  creation  of  a  new  habit  of  mind,  which  –  in  the
experience of the emergence of an intelligible form hovering between object and cognizer
– interlocks both in a possible continuous cognitive relation,  without which mind and
world would forever remain worlds apart:
Habit is that specialisation of the law of mind whereby a general idea gains the
power of exciting reactions. But in order that the general idea should attain all its
functionality, it is necessary, also, that it should become suggestible by sensations.
That  is  accomplished  by  a  psychical  process  having  the  form  of  hypothetic
inference. (EP 1: 328)
51 3) The degeneracy of the two other forms is grounded in the impurity of their mediality: in
an attraction which is either [ba] ‘not an immediate attraction for the idea itself’ (tychastic
agapism) or [bb] ‘not an immediate attraction for the idea itself’ (anancastic agapism). 
52 3.1) In the first case, the ground for the adoption of the habit, is not the idea as such, but
the semi-conscious mimesis of the habits of a “collective personality”: mere custom, the
individual  abides  by  almost  involuntarily,  though  lovingly  as  out  of  sympathy  with
others.  The  tychistic  stage  of  agapic  development  thus  represents  a  weak purposive
processuality which corresponds to the first manifestation of the social impulse: on the
lowest level of reflexivity, processes of interaction between organisms are necessary, in
which  mimetically adopted  habits  can  evolve  and  establish  the  primitive  “kind  of
coördination or connection of ideas” (EP1 : 331) on the existence of which the emergence
of an almost undifferentiated individual within a “collective personality” depends. The
continuity of mind diversifying itself in the evolution of culture and human purposes
does, thus,  have its first sedimentation in the establishment of semeiotic practices in
which the directionality of time and the spatial coordination of mental action emerges (
EP 1: 323-5). 
When an idea is conveyed from one mind to another, it is by forms of combination
of the diverse elements of nature, say by some curious symmetry, or by some union
of a tender color with a refined odor. To such forms the law of mechanical energy
has no application. […] They are embodied ideas; and so only can they convey ideas.
(EP 1: 333)
53 3.2) In the second case, the ground for the adoption of the habit, is not the idea in its
immediacy, but rather that which it helps us to accomplish (cf. [bb]). Consequently, we
observe  how  the  “collective  personality”  dominating  the  first  phase  diversifies  into
personalities,  which  now,  by  explicitly  conceiving  of  themselves  over  against  the
community, exist and act as “private person[s].” Peirce mentions St. Paul;  but we are
invited to think of a variety of historical individuals necessitated to experiencing their
existence in an identical categoriological constellation determining their adoption of a
new habit of thought. What characterizes the specific nature of the anancastic stage of
the agapic evolution of thought as exemplified in Socrates (Ap. 20c4 – 23b9), Saulus (Acts
 9: 3-9; 22: 6-16) or Mohamed (Qur’an 33: 19-22; 96: 1-5) is the necessity to bridge their
dualistic  existences  as  diversified,  committed  members  of  the  community  through
reformative action,43 thus grounding that “wider sort of social feeling” (EP 1:118), in which
the adoption of new ideas “affect[s] a private person directly […] by virtue of his sympathy
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with  his  neighbors,  under  the  influence  of  a  striking  experience  or  development  of
thought.” This mode, thus, is determined by the loss of a social unity it has emancipated
itself from and is animated by the desire to found new communities. The idea is thus not
apprehended for the sake of its contents, but of its use. 
54 4) The word “divination” encapsulates and structures Peirce’s thought on the possibility of
genuine agapic historical progress. Bearing in mind that Peirce – in conformity with the
historical role he ascribes to the method of authority as “the path of peace” (EP 1: 122) for
the  “intellectual  slaves”  of  the  “mass  of  mankind”  (EP 1:  118)  –  held  anancastic
development to have been “the chief factor in the historical evolution” (EP 1: 290), the
‘etymological chord’ divination nonetheless connects four ideas in a harmonious unity:
First,  the  idea  of  a  predictive  power  of  the  mind  (divination);  second,  the  idea  of
something’s originating from God (lat. divinus);  third, the idea of a supreme goodness
something has (engl. divine) and fourth, the etymological association of a latinization of
the homoíosis theoi (ital. divenire: to become; from lat. devenire: to descend from above),
i.e. the becoming like God.44
55 5) In speaking of “divination,” Peirce introduces four aspects of that genuine mode of
agapic evolution in which the social impulse transcends itself in the contemplative life of
theoría adopting an idea in its pure mediality “by virtue of the continuity of mind” (cf. [b]
). The third stage of the social impulse, thus, discloses the tendency of mind to establish
continua within itself by joining continua beyond itself: Historically, the idea of a highest
continuum man can relate to and immortalize in by surrendering the needs and wants of
his biological and political existence to an engagement with the cosmos in the aspect of
its pure intelligibility originates in the thought of Plato and Aristotle. With them, the
ultimate stage of  man’s ethical  development is  characterized by the dialectic of  self-
transcendence  and  true  self45 in  the  contemplative  life  with  its  capacity  to  grant
authentic eudaimonía in accordance with our psychic structure.  We thus see how the
modes of agapic development anchor the stages of the social impulse in bíoi (EN, I, 5) qua
degrees of self-transcendence in ecstatic feeling, the memory of the pólis and a life “in
conformity with the highest that is in us”:
The wise man, no less than the just one and all the rest, requires the necessaries of
life; […] but the wise man can practise contemplation by himself, and the wiser he
is, the more he can do it. No doubt he does it better with the help of fellow-workers;
but for all that he is the most self-sufficient of men. Again, contemplation would
seem to be the only activity that is appreciated for its own sake; because nothing is
gained from it except the act of contemplation, whereas from practical activities we
expect to gain something more or less over and above the action […]. [Thus] this
activity will be the perfect happiness for man […]. But such a life will be too high for
human attainment; for any man who lives it will do so not as a human being but in
virtue of something divine within him […]. So if the intellect is divine compared
with man, the life of the intellect must be divine compared with the life of a human
being […]. [W]e ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, […] do all that we
can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us; for even if it is small in bulk,
in power and preciousness it far excels all the rest. Indeed it would seem that this is
the true self of the individual, since it is the authoritative and better part of him; so
it would be an odd thing if a man chose to live someone else’s life instead of his
own. (EN, X, 7 )
56 The prevention of the “odd” choice, to which Aristotle here refers, seems to be at the
heart of Peirce’s understanding of what we have called ‘agent’s knowledge’: A wisdom
that  –  being of  the  nature  of  a  “developmental  teleology” (EP 1:  331)  and ensuing a
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harmony which, “at one and the same impulse,” requires the capacity of creative love of
“projecting creations into dependency” and “drawing them into harmony” (EP 1: 353) –
constitutes the ethical dimension of Peirce’s normative philosophy of history. It is, after
all, in every living second, up to us to lovingly conceive of the mode of connection of our
past with our possible futures.
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– TCSPS: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
– In citations from and references to C. S. Peirce’s writings the following notations
are used:
CP The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, followed by volume number and paragraph
number: The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols., vols. 1-6 Hartshorne, C. &
Weiss, P. (eds.), Cambridge, 1931-1935; vols. 7-8, Burks, A. (ed.), Cambridge, 1958. 
EP The Essential Peirce, followed by volume number and page number: The Essential Peirce,
vols. 1-2, Bloomington, 1998.
MS Manuscripts of Charles S. Peirce in the Houghton Library of Harvard University, followed by
manuscript number and page number, as identified in: Robin, R. (1967): Annotated
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Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce, Amherst, and in: Robin, R. (1971): The Peirce
Papers: A supplementary catalogue, in: TCSPS, vol. 7, 37-57.
W Writings of Charles S. Peirce, followed by voulme number and page number: Writings of
Charles S. Peirce. A Chronological Edition, vols. 1-8, Bloomington, 1982-.
– In citations from and references to F. W. J. Schelling the following notation is
used:
SW Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings sämmtliche Werke, Erste Abtheilung, vols. 1-10,
followed by volume and page number, ed. by K. A. Schelling, Stuttgart und Augsburg
1856-1861.
– In citations from and references to Immanuel Kant the following notation is used:
AHE The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Kant: Anthropology, History, Education, followed by
page number, ed. by Zöller, G., translated by Louden, R. B. and Zöller, G., Cambridge 2011.
CPR The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, followed by page
number of the first and/or second edition: Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by
Guyer, P. & Wood, A. W., Cambridge, 1998.
CPJ The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment, followed by
reference to page number: Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited by Guyer, P., translated
by Guyer, P. and Matthews, E., Cambridge, 2000.
RRT The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology,
followed by page number, edited and translated by Wood, A. & Di Giovanni, G., Cambridge
2001.
NOTES
1. Peirce, however, admits to being better acquainted with the “history of philosophy” than with
“political history” (CP 7.231).
2. Esposito (1983: 164) refers to CP 3.425, erroneously assuming that “The Regenerated Logic”
(1896) belongs to the Monist series of the early 1890s. 
3. See Taylor (1985: 80): Agent’s knowledge, according to Taylor, originates with Vico’s verum
ipsum factum (ibid.: 81) and reflects the beautifully commonsensical notion that “the degree of
awareness in our action is something we come to achieve” (ibid.: 84). 
4. This is also clearly brought out and emphasized by Hampe (2006: 40-1, 141-52).
5. Hampe (2006: 124-52).
6. EP 1:309, emphases mine.
7. See Barnouw 1988, and Lefevbre 2007.
8. See De Tienne (1996: 55ff.), Topa (2007: 113-56).
9. Cf. e.g. Esposito 1977 and 1980; Reynolds (2002: 5-25); and Franks 2015.
10. CPR, A 80/B 106.
11. Cf.  the  analogous  distinction between a  “repetitive  order” and a  universal  “greater  life-
history that every symbol furnished with a vehicle of life goes through” in the semeiotically
grounded metaphysics of history of the Minute Logic (CP 2.111).
12. In a letter to James from 1895, Peirce acknowledges that “my views were probably influenced
by Schelling, – by all stages of Schelling, but especially by the Philosophie der Natur” (Perry 1935:
416ff.), which implies he read substantial portions of Schelling’s works in the German original.
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Correlating  this  with  the  ‘confession’  to  have  been  introduced  to  the  thought  of  Schelling
through the acquaintance with the Concord Transcendentalists in his early youth (cf. EP 1: 312-3),
there is, then, good reason to assume that Peirce, after having studied Schiller and Kant, started
to read Schelling in the original around 1860.
13. I will be quoting Heath’s translation of the “System of Transcendental Idealism” (Schelling
1997), but refer to the pagination of the Sämtliche Werke which is also given there. 
14. Cf. AHE: 116: “One can regard the history of the human species in the large as the completion
of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an inwardly and, to this end, also an externally perfect
state constitution, as the only condition in which it can fully develop all its predispositions in
humanity.”
15. See MS 1334: 21 where Peirce defines ‘God’ as “the highest flight toward an understanding of
the original of the whole physico-psychical universe that we can make” of HIM as inquirers.
16. Cf. W 1:108.
17. All translations from “The Historical Construction of Christianity” are mine, unless otherwise
stated.
18. See Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Part III: “Concerning the victory of the
good over the evil principle and the founding of a Kingdom of God on earth,” in RRT: 129-71.
19. See e.g. Gallie (1952: 221-9); and Hookway 1997.
20. This embarrassment stems from the fact that the position Peirce develops in his metaphysics
– and which he is not too shy to call “Schellingism transformed in the light of modern physics”
(Letter  to  W. James,  1895,  quoted  in  Perry  1935:  416  ff.;  cf.  6.605)  or  a  “Schelling-fashioned
idealism” (EP 1: 312-3; cf. MS 400) – must appear as a betrayal to those who read (i.) the theory of
reality (cf. EP 1:120-1, 136-9) as a form of positivistic scientism, (ii.) the pragmatic maxim (cf. EP 1:
132) as a verificationist procedure, and (iii.) the theory of inquiry (cf. EP 1: 111-5) as a naturalistic
instrumentalism  anchored  in  a  proto-behavioristic  biologism,  in  which thought  and  the
development of its logicality are understood to be aiming at nothing nobler (and less relativistic)
than the production of adaptive habits of action.
21. CP 4.2  (1898):  “I  came to the study of  philosophy intensely curious about Cosmology and
Psychology.”
22. Note that this is the same problem that Kant, in The Critique of the Power of Judgment, tries to
solve  with  his  account  of  the  regulative  apriority  of  an  heautonomous  reflective  power  of
judgment; cf. CPJ, Introduction, IV.
23. For a further elucidation of this point see Hookway (1985: 265-71).
24. In their most primitive meaning, the Peircean categories we are here using represent the
three elementary and irreducible relational modes of the determination of being (cf. e.g. EP 1: 242
and EP 2: 267-8). A fine introduction to Peirce’s categoriology is offered by de Waal (2013: 33-46)
25. See Peirce’s identification of the “third grade of clearness of apprehension” of the meaning of
a concept with the reflection on its “conceived sensible effects” on the basis of the pragmatic
maxim in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (EP 1: 132). Before, Peirce reflects on the historical
impact the cultural preference for two opposed conceptions of the goodness of ideas might have:
On  the  one  hand,  the  preference  for  an  “excessive  wealth  of  language  and  its  natural
concomitant, a vast, unfathomable deep of ideas”; on the other hand, the pragmatic predilection
for a language “whose ideas […] are few, but which possesses a wonderful mastery over those
that it has” (EP 1: 126-7).
26. Fichte (1982: 198-9): “The Science of Knowledge is to be a pragmatic history of the human
mind.”
27. Cf. Coleridge (1983: 129-67).
28. Cf. Goodman (2015: 147-61)
29. Cf. CP 5.133.
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30. Items on this  agenda are  (i.)  descriptions  of  the practices  constituting the methods;  (ii.)
implicit  analyses  of  the faculties  involved and the specific  historical  constellations emerging
among  them;  emphasis  on  individuating  the  (iii.)  social,  (iv.)  objective  and  (v.)  normative
relations established in the practices of each method between the individual on the one and the
community, world and rational thought on the other hand.
31. Murphey’s (1961: 164-5) decision to read section V of “FOB” as a mere assemblage of methods,
leads him to a view which has significantly shaped later scholarship: once the first three methods
are degraded to “straw methods” (Murphey 1961: 165), the main problem is no longer an analysis
of the moments of scientific rationality, but the justification of the superiority of the method of
science and the ensuing search for Peircean arguments supporting this claim, which then, quite
unsurprisingly, turn out to be “barely worthy of the name” (Murphey 1961: 164). By taking it for
granted that  “there is  no historical  justification of  the list”  (Murphey 1961:  164),  Murphey’s
interpretation buries the distinction between historiography and a philosophy of history in the
graveyard of oblivion and prevents the contextualization of “FOB” in the idealist tradition, taken
up again by Smyth 1988.
32. Cf. SW V: 287: “There is no state of barbarism that does not have its origins in a perished
culture.”
33. Misak (2004: 57-8); and cf. Hookway (1985: 48-9).
34. This analytical abstractness and real interdependence of the methods is also seen by Pape
(2002: 65-79).
35. Hookway (1985: 48).
36. External anancasm, which praxeologically corresponds to the uniformity of will brought about
by  the  forced  surrender  of  the  will  of  the  individual  to  “the  will  of  the  state”  through  its
techniques of indoctrination, censorship and degrees of violence as ultima ratio of its power (cf.
EP 1: 117), thus establishes vast historical spaces dominated by the gradually morphing belief-
systems of monotheistic faiths, which utilize the intellects, hearts and hands of human beings to
produce and refine material culture (cf. EP 1: 118).
37. Internal  anancasm or  “logical  groping”  (EP 1:  368)  brings  about  a  change  of  ideas  not  by
external constraints, but by causes “internal to the mind as logical developments of ideas already
accepted,  such as  generalisations”  (EP 1:  364)  and corresponds  to  the  a  priori  method as  its
processual ground of historical concretization.
38. See CPJ: 28, 72.
39. Peirce in a letter from 1882 to his brother James Mills, quoted in EP 1: 211.
40. All three transitional reflections are related to NPBF (cf. III.2) and can be reconstructed as
aspects of a sensus communis, in the sense that the § 40 of the Critique of the Power of Judgement
defines  it  as  “a  faculty  of  judgement” that  “in its  reflection takes account” of  the following
“maxims of  common human understanding”:  “1.  to  think for oneself;  2.  to  put  ourselves  in
thought in the place of everyone else; 3. always to think consistently” (CPJ, § 40; see AHE, 307-8,
for a parallel in § 43 of the Anthropology).
41. Cf. the account Peirce gives of reflection in the earliest phase of his evolutionary metaphysics
in “Design and Chance”:  although reflection is  “the instrument by which we make ourselves
rational,  it  does not follow that it  is  essential  to rationality” (EP 1:  222-3).  For Peirce,  in this
period, reflexivity thus is only an accidental remedy for a generic imperfection in our modes of
bringing thought to unity. 
42. An exception is the excellent interpretation offered by Pape 1997.
43. Cf. Peirce’s division of three classes of men, in: MS 1334: 16-8.
44. Cf. Plato, Theaitetus, 176 a-b and Timaeus, 90 a-d.
45. Cf. Ventimiglia 2008; and Colapietro (1989: 61-97, and esp. 95-7) on this theme in Peirce.
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ABSTRACTS
This study aims at a better understanding of Peirce’s conception of a philosophy of history. Peirce
has a well defined place for historiography in his classification of the sciences, but what he has to
say about history as a philosopher is not primarily referring to it as a form of historiographic
knowledge, but to history as a process and a medium. As a process, history is, fundamentally, a
cooperative  activity  of  man  resulting  in  civilization  and  capable  of  varying  categoriological
degrees  of  directionality  that  reflect  the  ‘agents’  knowledge’  of  history  incorporated  in  the
communicative  practices  of  their  community.  As  a  medium,  history  –  in  the  light  of  the
cosmogonic narrative of Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics and of his mature conception of the
summum  bonum –  is  one  of  two  forms  of  expression  of  the  Absolute.  Our  paper  studies  the
development of these conceptions from the Schellingian influences on “The Place of Our Age in
the History of Civilization” (1863), to “Fixation of Belief” (1877) and “Evolutionary Love” (1892).
Throughout  this  development,  Peirce  remains  primordially  interested  in  the  philosophy  of
history as a mode of normatively conceiving of history (as a medium) in a way that enables us to
pragmatically project our cultural development as a process in which an increasing control over
our own history is actualized.
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